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Abstract 
 
Science Diplomacy as a practice has a long past but only a short history. It became a policy concern 
of Foreign Affairs only recently. This article points to the strengths and weaknesses of Science 
Diplomacy as a soft power instrument aimed at improving International Relations. It also lists a 
number of threats coming from populist and protectionist forces that hinder the further development 
of Science Diplomacy. At the same time, the current situation also bears opportunities such as the 
potential to develop a scientist-driven Science Diplomacy aimed at safeguarding the values of science 
and at strengthening the input of science in humanity coping with global problems. This can best be 
realised by establishing mission-driven networks of state policy-makers, scientists and relevant 
stakeholders. 
 
1. The long past and short history of Science Diplomacy 
 
The notion of Science Diplomacy has been used in policy documents and scholarly writings ever since 
1990, when J. Nye introduced the notion of ‘soft power’ to indicate that states can, next to their military 
and economic power, also exert power through their cultural assets, including their science systems1. 
Today, Science Diplomacy is regarded as a policy tool by several governments, and it is becoming a 
topic of research as well23. It is part of a wider movement that is gradually opening up the practices 
of diplomacy. The current state of diplomacy has indeed changed dramatically: it is no longer only a 
matter of national diplomats being sent to other countries, the missions have expanded from politics 
to economy and other issues such as environment or nuclear weapons. This makes the diplomat “an 
                                                            
 
1 NYE, Joseph, Soft Power: The Means to Success in World Politics. Chapter 1: The Changing Nature of Power, New York: 
Public Affairs. 
2 FLINK, Tim and SCHREITERER, Ulrich, Science diplomacy at the intersection of S&T policies and foreign affairs: toward a 
typology of national approaches, Science and Public Policy, vol. 37, no. 9, 2010, pp. 665-677. 
3 LÓPEZ DE SAN ROMÁN, Alea and SCHUNZ, Simon, Understanding European Union Science Diplomacy, Journal of Common 
Market Studies, 2017, pp. 1-20. 
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expert in negotiation, regardless of the areas concerned”4. Proof of this is the rich vocabulary regarding 
‘new’ forms of diplomacy that has emerged this past decade: economic diplomacy, energy diplomacy, 
nuclear diplomacy, environmental/green diplomacy, cultural diplomacy and digital diplomacy.  
 
The academic and policy interest in Science and Technology only came after decades of practices 
that already involved scientists in international relations endeavours. As early as 1956 for instance, 
the U.S. State department and its counterpart in the U.S.S.R. facilitated links between American and 
Soviet virologists, to collaborate in producing the oral polio vaccine5. But it is only in the first 
decennium of the 21st century that Science Diplomacy became an established concept in policy 
documents. A key milestone was the 2009 statement of Hillary Clinton, then U.S. Secretary of State, 
who stated that “science diplomacy and science and technology and cooperation (…) is one of our most 
effective ways of influencing and assisting other nations and creating real bridges between the United 
States and counterparts”6. Another milestone was the publication of the American Association for the 
Advancement of Science (AAAS) and the Royal Society report in 2010 that set the scene by 
introducing three forms of Science Diplomacy: Science for Diplomacy, Science in Diplomacy, 
Diplomacy for Science. This typology places these three distinct practices under the umbrella of the 
more general concept Science Diplomacy. It also paved the way for a wide acceptance of Science 
Diplomacy as a policy concern. A year earlier, President Obama had announced in his Cairo speech 
that the U.S. would start sending science envoys to the Middle East and would seek a more 
comprehensive engagement with Muslim-majority countries or countries with significant Muslim 
populations, and their people by expanding partnerships in areas like education, economic 
development, science and technology, and health, among others, while continuing to work together to 
address issues of common concern.  
 
As a result, a growing number of practices are today labelled as Science Diplomacy. Interestingly, this 
is also being done retrospectively, and some practices of the past that were not labelled as Science 
Diplomacy when they took place, are now presented as Science Diplomacy. A classic example is the 
Soviet and American joint space explorations in the 1960s and 1970s. Also, several countries have 
started using the concept of Science Diplomacy when referring to their already existing international 
RTD policies such as support to exchange programs or the creation of posts of science attachés in 
embassies. As a consequence, there now exist several policy tools and instruments that are labelled 
as Science Diplomacy (see Van Langenhove, 2017, for an overview of such tools in Europe7). The EU, 
which is one of the biggest science funding authorities in the world, also embraced the concept in its 
policy declarations regarding RTD and their ‘open to the world’ policy. And more and more countries 
seem to be jumping on the bandwagon, be it sometimes only to use their scientific resources as 
promotional material for projecting a country’s reputation and influence. Science is increasingly 
becoming an object of strategic communication and governmental public relations.  
 
2. A SWOT analysis of Science Diplomacy 
 
The interest in and practice of Science Diplomacy has considerably expanded over the past years as 
is demonstrated by its more prominent role in policy discourses and academic interest. This can be 
related to its perceived strengths for the modern diplomatic toolkit. Nevertheless, the concept is not 
without problems. Not only are there some weaknesses inherent to the concept as a policy tool, there 
are also some societal developments that might threaten to jeopardise its further ascent. But on the 
other hand, there might be opportunities as well. 
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The major perceived strength of Science Diplomacy is that scientists’ engagement in international 
cooperation is regarded as something that could be beneficial to build trust and thus better relations 
between states that are in dispute or conflict. Often this goes with an idealistic discourse of scientists 
speaking all the same language of science, which puts science in a position of being able to bring 
people, even in conflict zones, together. As such, Science Diplomacy is often portrayed as a tool 
towards peace-building and conflict reconciliations. But all of this is difficult to prove, although there 
are some success stories of how science has contributed to solving or mitigating international 
conflicts. A classic example is the involvement of nuclear physicists in the nuclear deal with Iran.  
 
However, there are weaknesses as well. As the notion of Science Diplomacy is vague and multi-faceted, 
scientists will tend to be rather sceptic towards governments that want to ‘use’ them whilst pursuing 
their foreign affairs policy. Reversely, foreign governments could react equally wary and reluctant 
when cooperation in science is suddenly framed as a foreign policy, and thus diplomacy, initiative. 
Meanwhile, on the other side of the spectrum, most governments lack a clear strategy regarding 
Science Diplomacy and for others, it even seems just a buzzword to label their policy of nation-
branding and self-promotion.  
 
The concept of Science Diplomacy covers many different aspects, as is exemplified in the widely-used 
definition put forward by AAAS that distinguishes between science in diplomacy, science for 
diplomacy and diplomacy for science. But across these different takes is a tendency that the main 
supporters and investigators of Science Diplomacy are mostly located in policy communities. As 
such, one of the main drivers for Science Diplomacy are policy makers in states or intergovernmental 
organisations. This poses the question of the extent to which scientists are actually involved in 
Science Diplomacy. Do they take this seriously? Are they pushing their own agendas?  
 
On top of that, the current era of populism poses new threats to the science system at large and to 
Science Diplomacy specifically. Some governments prefer to present ‘alternative facts’ to counter 
‘scientific facts’ or try to limit access to scientific data that do not support what governments want to 
hear. Populism is often accompanied by nationalism and protectionism, which stand to the opposite 
of the ideals of the scientific community. The risk of protectionism for science is that governments 
will increasingly attempt to keep scientific findings within the boundaries of their own country. These 
developments not only endanger the whole endeavour of science but also the practice of Science 
Diplomacy as it puts the ‘open to the world’ worldview of science at risk. 
 
Scientists can also be asked to provide advice to ministries and the government and are in this way 
involved in evidence-based policy-making. This practice is traditionally called science in diplomacy and 
was already brought into life in 1933 by president Roosevelt under the name Science Advisory Board, 
under president Obama called the PCAST- the President’s Council of Advisors on Science and 
Technology8. Since the coming into office of president Trump, the PCAST hasn’t had any formal 
meetings or published any formal documents9. Also, many scientists advising the government have 
resigned. Understandable, as it is difficult to give advice to a president who apparently had doubts 
about recognizing climate change as a scientific fact. Maybe one of the most exemplary actions was 
the resignation letter of professor Kammen, where he stated that "It was sadly easy to step down 
because I view what the President is saying as inconsistent with what's in the best interests of the 
country and my mandate as science envoy"10. 
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Describing how diplomacy for science (diplomatic initiatives for the sake of science) has looked like 
this past year under the Trump government, would be downright depressing. UNESCO membership 
has been withdrawn, the Iran nuclear deal –arguably one of the biggest diplomatic breakthroughs 
these past years, made possible by physicists! - heavily criticised. More recently, senior 
representatives of the National Science Foundation (NSF) in Europe and China have been recalled to 
the U.S. Although a skeleton crew will be left behind at the NSF missions in Brussels and Beijing, such 
a move has the potential to seriously damage crucial networks of scientific collaboration which have 
been build up over the years.11 Top-down support for Science Diplomacy in the U.S. seems to be 
scarce these days.  
 
Finally, there are also opportunities to further develop Science Diplomacy. The most important one lies 
in the growing awareness of global problems. Almost all of today’s pressing global problems such as 
climate change or energy security have a scientific component. Hence the need to link global 
governance with scientific evidence. On 25 September 2015, the United Nations adopted a set of 
ambitious goals to end poverty, protect the planet, and ensure prosperity for all as part of a new 
sustainable development agenda. Each goal has specific targets to be achieved over the next 15 
years. For these, different actors need to do their parts: governments, the private sector, civil society 
and also the scientific communities. Science Diplomacy might therefore just be the required tool to 
realise these goals12.  
 
Another opportunity lies in the increasing networked organisation of governance.13 In this context, 
Denmark has recently done something no country has done before- delegating a direct ambassador 
to the -stateless! - private sector.14 The digital ambassador was appointed to GAFA (Google, Apple, 
Facebook, Amazon)- a world without borders, but wherein each enterprise generates as much capital 
as an average country- Apple would easily fit within the G20. France was first in this practice, as it had 
discreetly appointed a “special representative of France to international negotiations on the 
information society and the digital economy”15. This is undoubtedly a turning point for practices in 
diplomacy. These companies can trace everyone’s actions, and their active cooperation with the 
security services has helped a great deal in fighting and tracing radicalisation and cybercrimes.  
 
The most important opportunity is perhaps that the growing ICT interconnectedness of the world 
gives scientist the possibility to deepen their global networks. And some governmental actors seem 
to take the values of science serious. The EU for that matter seems to be on the forefront. Not only is 
the ‘open to the world’ policy of the EU’s science policy encouraging, so is the fact that that the EU 
currently supports several research projects that study Science Diplomacy. This can only strengthen 
the ‘ownership’ of Science Diplomacy by the scientific community.  
 
Conclusion: finding a purpose for Science Diplomacy 
 
Since the 2010 joint report of AAAS and the Royal Society, it is commonly accepted that Science 
Diplomacy has three interwoven strands: science for diplomacy, science in diplomacy and diplomacy 
for science. This view has certainly contributed to putting Science Diplomacy on the agenda of policy-
makers across the world as well as bringing many different practices under one umbrella. The 
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downside has been that Science Diplomacy has become a catch-all concept that is used for different 
purposes and leaves both policy-makers and scientists confused about what it is all about. 
 
In a report commissioned by the European Commission, Van Langenhove16 has advanced a proposal 
to distinguish between three areas that are a mix of state self-interests and aspirations to have a 
positive impact on the world. These areas are: (i) Science and Technology contributions towards 
enhancing regional security in a state’s neighbourhood and (ii) Science and technology contributions 
towards improving the economic position of a state in the world and (iii) Science and Technology 
contributions towards tackling global problems. As for the latter, Van Langenhove17 also called for an 
increased involvement and ownership of the agenda by scientists themselves. 
 
More recently, Turekian et al (2018) have echoed these three categories by pleading for three new 
categories for Science Diplomacy: promote national interests, address cross border issues or tackle 
global challenges.18  
 
This emerging consensus between scholars and practitioners to rethink the practice of Science 
Diplomacy is encouraging. But it should be complemented by an acknowledgment of the fact that 
states do not have a monopoly on Science Diplomacy. There is space for a scientist-driven Science 
Diplomacy as well. 
 
Recommendations 
 
1. Science Diplomacy as a practice needs to be both science-driven and state-driven. This implies that 
states need to incorporate science diplomacy in their Foreign Affairs policy and that science 
organisations need to put science diplomacy on their agenda. 
 
2. State-driven Science Diplomacy needs to be organised as three distinct endeavours focusing on 
promoting national (trade) interests, addressing regional cross border issues and tackling global 
challenges. 
 
3. Science-driven Science Diplomacy needs to be organised around the defence of science against 
populism, the contribution to tackling global problems and the involvement in building peace between 
conflicting states. 
 
4. Both states and scientists should act together and form mission-driven networks as tools to deal 
with resilience, execution and scale problems they encounter in realising recommendations 2 and 3. 
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